INTRODUCTION
In the protracted debate about the use of contingency analyses of data of implicit and explicit tests of memory, spelled out in exhausting detail in papers such as those by Shimamura (1985) . Hayman and Tulving (1989a; 1989b) . Hintzman and H a n r y (1990) . Ostergaard (1992; this issue) and Tulving and Hayman (1993) . the latest scuffle focuses o n the problem of how one should measure priming.
T h e problem has arisen in connection with Ostergaard's (1992) Maximum Memory Dependence ( M M D ) model as a contrast t o the Stochastic Independence (SI) model that had been used exclusively previously. In applying the MMD model to published data, Ostergaard adopted an unusual baseline-the "test-primed baselinen-for measuring the amount of priming. Like everyone else who had ever done any priming experiments. we thought, and still think, that priming should be measured in terms of the difference between primed and non-primed items. In his 1992 paper. however, Ostergaard measured priming in terms of the difference between two kinds of primed performance, those designed as "testprimed" and "study-test primed" by Tulving, Schacter and Stark (1982, fig. 2 ).' Thus. when using MMD, priming is not what it has always been, it is the difference between some priming and a little more of it.
In an earlier report (Tulving & Hayman, 1993) . we thought Ostergaard (1992) had made a novel and important contribution with his MMD model. Now we see from his reply to our article (Ostergaard, this issue) that he was actually trying to make two important contributions in his article: the MMD model and his new definition of priming that no-one had ever used before. Like the two kinds of tests under consideration, however, his first conrriburion ua$ explictt, whcrcas the second was mo%t dendedly implint. Ostereaard (this iwuc) rclls us that: "Durine the develonment of the M M D --model, considerable thought was given to the question of what would constitute the most appropriate estimate of priming effects...". But he also must have given considerable thought to the problem of how to keep his thoughts about how to measure priming in MMD from being discovered by the readers. As best as we can tell, he adopted the following strategy for keeping the readers from realising that a revolution in the measurement of priming was afoot: tionally studied, as, for instance, when a word is presented as a distractor in a recognition test (Tulving et al., 1982) , and that such distractors have been primed by the time they appear in the identification test.
3. Never mention the concept of "test priming" or the existence of "test-primed" items under whatever terms! This may give the game away! Throughout the paper refer only to "studied and "non-studied" items. Identification of "non-studied" and "new" items also helps.
4. D o not say explicitly, anywhere in the paper, that a new measure of priming is being introduced. Given that everybody knows that priming is measured in terms of the comparison of primed performance with non-primed baseline, readers are unlikely to suspect a revolutionary departure from the tradition unless their attention is forcefullv directed to it.
, ~~~ ~~~
Therefore, do not draw their attention to it! 5. Write as if baseline identification performance included only one of the two components, the "non-memory" component. This can be done best by writing an equation; readers are usually impressed with such formality, and are therefore unlikely to wonder how it is possible for testprimed items, used as the "non-studied" baseline, nor to include any "memory" component. This is important, because if the readers figure out that both the "non-studied" baseline and the "studied" performance include both "memory" and "non-memory" components. the MMD model, as presented, does not make sense and they may start wondering what is going on.
Ostergaard carried out this plan brilliantly, and in consummate detail. As a result of this plan, his second contrib"tion-the new procedure for measuring priming in "recognitiodidentification" experiments-remained concealed from iust about e v e~b o d v .~ Now. however. that the cat is out 2 , of the bag, we have to come to grips with i t . '~h a t should we make of his suggestion?
WHAT IS THE CORRECT BASELINE?
Ostergaard's newly revealed justification of the test-primed baseline is based on one central idea: The "memory" components that enter into the contingency relation between priming and explicit memory must be attributable to a single study episode, the "original srudy episode" (Ostergaard, this issue, p. 6). He does not provide any reasons for this curious choice other than a few questionable, out-ofsontext, quotes from the "proponents" of contingency analyses.
We find this choice odd, for several reasons, some of which we have already mentioned, such as Ostergaard's own definition of the "priming effects". and the fact that the performance with test-primed items also includes a "memory" component. More important. however, is the fact that the relevant issue has always been the relation between the processes underlying performance changes on implicit and explicit tests of memory. rather than consequences of a single study episode. The title of the initial Tulving et al. (1982) study, "Priming effects in word-fragment completion are independent of recognition memory", reflects the orientation. Nowhere in that paper was there any mention of the single or original study episode. Nor did the concept of a "single study episode" occur anywhere in the discussion of early studies of priming in Tulving (1983) . Indeed. tying the phenomenon of priming to a single study episode would have been absurd. given that the seminal studies by Warrington and Weiskrantz (1968: 1970) with amnesic patients, which inspired the Tulving et al. (1982) study with normal subjects. had used multiple study trials. In many subsequent experiments, too, multiple study trials have routinely been used (e.g. Challis The point is this. There is no rational or empirical reason to assume, as Ostergaard (this issue) does. that priming that occurs as a result of a single experimental exposure of the target item is qualitatively different from multiple-exposure priming, or that empirical findings, such as stochastic independence between recognition and primed identification, are affected by the number of presentations of the target items at study. It is possible, of course, that they do. But verification of such a state of affairs is better achieved through experiment than assertion.
A keg ingredient in Ostergaard's argument against the conventional baseline is his thought experiment in which the retention interval in the "recognition/identification" experiment is stretched to many years. Its anticipated results, he says, would lead to "bizarre conclusions". Although we are great fans of thought experiments and believe in their value, we have reservations ahout this one. After a very long retention interval, subjects' recognition performance is going to be on or near the "floor", and experiments producing data on the "floor" are not very informative. Good scientists d o not do such experiments. By the logic of Ostergaard's (1992) own MMD model, too, it is not possible to discriminate between the predictions of the MMD model and the SI model in a situation in which the "memory" component of one test (here, recognition) is or approaches zero. The fact that "test-priming" effects are likely to be well above zero is irrelevant.
In summary, Ostergaard's (this issue) concept of the "original study episode" is a red herring. There is no rational reason to expect that the quiddity of priming, including its relation to other forms of learning, should depend on the number of study episodes. If it could be shown empirically that the relation between priming and other forms of learning changes across study trials, it would constitute interesting news. But in the absence of such evidence, restricting the study of the nature of priming to priming produced by the original srudv episode makes no sense. 
